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IPRE-PAID AND GROUP LEGAL SERVICES:
THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE STORM
Judith L. Maute*
INTRODUCTION
Middle America considers reasonable access to adequate and
affordable health care to be a necessity of life. Government-
subsidized care provides a minimal safety net for the poor, disabled,
elderly or underemployed who cannot afford either private health
care insurance or medical care on a fee-for-services basis.
Overwhelmingly, the middle class looks to some form of health
insurance to assure access to medical care, whether through a third-
party payer system, such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield, or a health
maintenance program.' Many people routinely take into account
health care coverage as they make important life decisions about
employment, choice of physicians and discretionary medical
treatment. Access to health care is now considered so fundamental to
quality of life that numerous federal and state statutes regulate the
insurance aspects affecting delivery of services.2 Lack of adequate
medical insurance can have disastrous effects on both personal and
financial well-being.'
Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. Invaluable research assistance was
provided by Jonathan Grant Ellis (J.D. expected 2003, University of Oklahoma).
Donald T. Bogan generously shared his understanding of the health care industry and
ERISA. The University of Oklahoma provided research support. Of course, any
mistakes or omissions are those of the author.
1. Estimates vary, but it appears that between eleven percent and nineteen
percent of Americans are not covered by health insurance. Teresa A. Sullivan, et al.,
The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt 149 (2000).
2. Proposals for a federal Patient Bill of Rights, H.R. 2563 and S. 283, are being
considered in Congress. See Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Savings Clause, § 502
Implied Preemption, Complete Preemption, and State Law Remedies, 42 Santa Clara
L. Rev. 303 (forthcoming December 2001) (manuscript at 7 n.24, on file with authori
[hereinafter Bogan, ERISA]; Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, H.R. 2563, 107'
Cong. (2001). HMO reforms at the state level have been attempted, but their validity
is open to question. See, e.g., Corp. Health Ins. v. Tex. Dept. of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th
Cir. 2000) (discussing Texas HMO reform law); Moran v. Rush Prudential, 230 F.3d
959 (7th Cir. 2000), cert granted, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (June 29,2001); cf Donald T. Bogan,
Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme Court Allow States to
Regulate Managed Care?, 74 Tul. L Rev. 951, 952 (2000) [hereinafter Bogan,
Protecting] (noting that ERISA deregulates the health care industry by pre-empting
state health care reform laws)
3. Sullivan, et al., supra note 1, at 147-57 (describing role of uninsured medical
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Similarly, an unsatisfied need for adequate quality legal services can
be personally devastating, although the impact may not be manifested
dramatically until it is too late to resolve the underlying problem. For
over thirty years, the organized bar has studied, squabbled and
lamented over how to address the unmet legal needs of the middle
class. It appears that some headway has been made through the
provision of group legal services and pre-paid legal insurance.
Despite aggressive opposition from some segments of the bar, group
legal services have gained a toehold. Estimates vary, but it appears
that twenty-five to forty percent of Americans have some coverage
through a legal services plan.4 Viewed from the perspectives of
consumers, lawyers and public policy, this recent trend is a positive
step. To the extent that consumer clients can be matched with lawyers
who provide competent legal advice on routine matters at an
affordable price, everyone benefits. The questions remain: why has it
taken so long, and what barriers still exist to insuring the availability
of competent counsel to middle America? This essay begins to
consider those questions.
Part I explores the tortured history of group legal services, starting
with the traditional fee-for-services paradigm which places the burden
on the client to locate a competent attorney and reach agreement on
the work to be done and the fee to be paid. Beginning in the 1960s,
the consumer and legal services movements combined with a trilogy
of Supreme Court decisions on closed panel group legal services to
force an intransigent bar to relax strict ethics rules that rendered
innovative forms of group legal practice illegal or financially
unfeasible. In 1965, when the American Bar Association undertook
to draft the Code of Professional Responsibility, group legal services
was the most contentious issue. Since 1975, however, the ABA has
embraced the concept, actively supporting the development of an
industry and trade group committed to economical, quality delivery of
legal services to middle-income persons through prepaid group plans.
Part II describes recent developments in the group legal services
industry. The intransigence of the organized bar has been replaced
with formal support and perhaps benign indifference; most lawyers do
debt as major factor in middle-class financial disasters and bankruptcies).
4. See Brian Heid & Eitan Misulovin, The Group Legal Plan Revolution: Bright
Horizon or Dark Future?, 18 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 335 (2000); Alec M. Schwartz,
A Lawyer's Guide to Prepaid Legal Services, Legal Econ., July/Aug. 1989, at 43
(stating that as of 1987, thirteen million Americans enrolled in prepaid legal plans and
another seventeen million in other group legal plans); James S. Wilbur, Practicing
Under a Prepaid Legal Plan: The Obstacles, Though Numerous, Are Surmountable,
Nat'l L. J., Jan. 21, 1991, at 15; The National Resource Center's 2000 Legal Services
Plan Census, at http://www.nrccls.org/Publications/LegaLCensus/2001.html (last
visited June 21, 2001) [hereinafter NRCCLS websitel (stating that 152 million people
are covered by plans (fig. 4); that the number of persons with prepaid plan coverage is
much smaller, 17.8 million (fig. 5); and that eight million military personnel also
receive group legal services (fig. 4)).
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not fully understand or appreciate that group legal services may be the
wave of the future. These services hold the potential for
fundamentally changing the legal marketplace by providing
meaningful access to counsel at affordable prices, with an emphasis on
preventive lawyering and dispute resolution. Non-lawyer promoters
of group legal services are aggressively marketing their product, both
to individual purchasers and through employee benefit packages.
Because their success in the marketplace depends upon customer
satisfaction, these plans are implementing managerial techniques to
screen lawyer participants for competence and to monitor for timely,
satisfactory performance of the legal work. A creative dynamic
tension must be maintained between lawyers' professionalism and the
entrepreneurship and management techniques that shape the prepaid
legal services industry. Finally, Part II of this article discusses some of
the problems that have hampered the health care industry since the
advent of managed care and highlights some of the lessons that may
be drawn from those experiences.
I. TORTURED HISTORY OF GROUP LEGAL SERVICES
A. The Traditional Client-Lawyer Paradigm
Rugged individualism has shaped most facets of American culture,
including the client-lawyer paradigm.' Until quite recently,
prospective clients bore primary responsibility to recognize they had a
legal problem, locate a lawyer willing to help, and hire that lawyer on
the basis of fees-for-services. Ethical rules prohibiting advertising,
solicitation and volunteering advice cast lawyers in a passive and
reactive mode.6 The model worked reasonably well for some
sophisticated consumers of legal services, particularly repeat users,
who had established contacts with the legal community and access to
reliable information about lawyers competent in their area of need.7
For many occasional users, however, finding a lawyer competent to
provide a particular type of legal services at an affordable cost was a
matter of pure serendipity.
Early in the twentieth century, legal aid offices formed in some
cities to meet the pressing legal needs of the poor.' The organized bar
5. Derek C. Bok, A Flawed Systenz of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. Legal Ed.
570, 575 (1983).
6. Eugene L. Smith, Canon 2: A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in
Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available. 48 Tex. L Rev. 285 (1970).
7. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Specuhltions on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974). reprinted in Robert M. Cover & Owen
M. Fiss, The Structure of Procedure 199 (1979).
8. Harrison Tweed, The Legal Aid Society: New York City 1876-1951, at 5-8
(1954) (describing early efforts in New York City, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, Los
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gave some financial and symbolic support to those charitable
programs. For example, the 1908 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics
expressly excluded such "charitable societies" from the rule
prohibiting interference by lay intermediaries.9  Otherwise, the
traditional ethics rules stressed that "[a] lawyer's responsibilities and
qualifications are individual."' 10 A lawyer could accept employment
from an organization regarding its own legal matters, but could not
render legal services to its members regarding their individual
affairs."
B. Supreme Court's Constitutional Pressures for Change
A trilogy of Supreme Court decisions in the mid-1960s forced the
organized bar to relax strict ethics rules prohibiting lawyers'
involvement with group legal services. First, in NAACP v. Button, the
Court held that the organization had a constitutionally-protected right
of political association to make available attorneys willing to bring
civil rights and desegregation cases on behalf of its members. The
Commonwealth of Virginia had no compelling state interest sufficient
to justify its strict antisolicitation statutes.2 Never before had the
Court found "a fundamental and potentially absolute constitutional
restriction upon the power of the states to regulate the practice of
law."' 3 Button did not alarm most lawyers, who pigeonholed it as a
special case involving civil rights. 4 The bombshell came the next year,
in 1964, with Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel
Virginia State Bar (BRT).15 The trainworkers' union established a
program referring injured workers and their families to select lawyers
who would prosecute claims against the railroad. Virginia sought an
injunction, claiming it violated antisolicitation rules and constituted
the unauthorized practice of law. Again the Supreme Court found the
state's regulatory effort failed, because it violated protected rights of
"free speech, petition and assembly.' 6 The surprised organized bar
joined in opposition, with the ABA and forty state bars filing an
application to appear as amicus curiae, seeking a rehearing. 7 The
final case in the trilogy was yet to come.
Angeles and San Francisco).
9. Canons of Prof'1 Ethics, Canon 35 (1908).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
13. Barlow F. Christensen, Regulating Group Legal Services: Who is Being
Protected-Against What-and Why?, 11 Ariz. L. Rev. 229,231 (1969).
14. Id.
15. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
16. Id. at 5.
17. Elliott E. Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the
Individual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 UCLA L. Rev. 438,450 (1964).
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C. ABA's Ambitious Initiatives Encounter Political Realities
BRT gave the Bar a new urgency to improve delivery of legal
services. In 1965, ABA President Lewis F. Powell, Jr. committed to
revamp the outdated Canons in order to avert reformers' efforts to
create a government-subsidized legal service program that would
undermine traditional professional concerns, and to improve access to
services by the middle class." Powell's extraordinary leadership set in
motion three distinct efforts which consumed organizational efforts
for much of the next five years. The Special Committee on
Evaluation of Ethical Standards, or the "Wright Committee" (named
for its chair, Edward L. Wright) undertook revision of the ethics rules.
The Special Committee of Availability of Legal Services, also known
as the "McCalpin Committee" or "Availability Committee" worked
closely with Barlow Christensen, of the American Bar Foundation, to
study the unmet needs of the middle class, and create viable
mechanisms to address the issue. Finally, Powell forged a
compromise between poverty law activists and the bar, which resulted
in government funding of what became the Legal Services Program.'
1. Code of Professional Responsibility (1965-1976)
The Wright and McCalpin Committees worked steadily for several
years.20 Texas attorney Paul Carrington served as liaison between
them, officially representing the Availability Committee in the
redrafting of the ethics code.21 Without a doubt, issues surrounding
group legal services were the most controversial. Canon 2, on the
professional duty to help make available legal services, consumed
18. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., The President's Page, 51 A.B.A. J. 3,20 (1965) (discussing
proposed government-sponsored legal assistance and how BRT gives new urgency for
need to improve delivery of legal services).
19. Interview with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Olavi Maru, interviewer. July 1975.
American Bar Foundation Oral History Program. Visited May 28, 2001
http://wwv.abf-sociolegal.orgloralhistory/powell.html [hereinafter Powell Interview].
20. The McCalpin Committee operated between 1965 and 1970, regularly meeting
for long weekends at the O'Hare Inn in Chicago. Members included Paul Carrington,
former ABA President Chesterfield Smith, Theodore Vorhees and Robert Kutak.
Besides the most contentious issues of prepaid and group legal services, it also
considered legal aid, lawyer referral services and other ways to improve delivery
systems. Professor Elliott Cheatham served as advisor to the committee. See, e.g.,
Interview with William F. McCalpin. Olavi Maru, interviewer. Aug. 22, 1975.
American Bar Foundation Oral History Program. Visited May 28, 2001
http:/www.abf-sociolegal.orgloralhistory/mccalpin.html [hereinafter McCalpin
Interview]; Interview with Theodore Vorhees. Olavi Maru, interviewer. Nov. 21,
1975. American Bar Foundation Oral History Program. Visited May 28, 2001
http:llwww.abf-sociolegal.orgloralhistory/vorhees.html [hereinafter Vorhees
Interview]; Interview with Paul Carrington. Olavi Maru, interviewer. May 13, 1975.
American Bar Foundation Oral History Program. Visited May 28, 2001
http://www.abf-sociolegal.orgloralhistory/carrington.html [hereinafter Carrington
Interview].
21. Carrington Interview, supra note 20, at 36.
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about half of the Wright Committee's time.22 While the ABA
committees struggled with the issues, the Supreme Court dealt the
final, resounding blow to conservative resistance to group legal
services. United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association13
upheld the constitutionality of a closed panel plan in which the union
referred injured members' compensation claims to a private lawyer
salaried by the union.
Bar politics profoundly influenced the drafting and adoption of the
provisions regulating group legal services. From the start, the Wright
Committee clearly understood that Canon 35 on lay intermediaries
required considerable revision to comply with BRT. 4 While these
two committees toiled on revisions, other forces within the bar tried to
sidetrack their efforts?1 The Wright Committee worked in secret, 26
until January 1969, when it circulated 15,000 copies of the Preliminary
Draft of the Code of Professional Responsibility." Bill McCalpin
personally met twice with the Wright Committee, and "advocat[ed]
rather vehemently" to abandon the traditional restraints on
advertising and solicitation as applied to group legal services. 8 His
efforts met with initial success. The Preliminary Draft allowed lawyer
involvement with referral services, and also provision of legal services
through trade associations, unions, bona fide non-profit organizations,
"reputable" bar associations and community organizations.29 Many
22. Interview with Edward L. Wright. Olavi Maru, interviewer. Oct. 28, 1976.
American Bar Foundation Oral History Program. Visited May 28, 2001
http://www.abf-sociolegal.org/oralhistory/wright.html [hereinafter Wright Interview].
23. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
24. See General Comments of the ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of
Ethical Standards 51 (undated) (obtained from Harvard Law Library, papers of A.
James Casner) (copy on file with the Fordham Law Review); Letter from Sherman
Welpton, Jr. to Edward L. Wright, Chairman, ABA Special Committee on Evaluation
of Ethical Standards 28 (Nov. 24, 1964) (transmitting initial draft of revisions) (copy
on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Welpton letter]; Interview with
Sherman S. Welpton, Jr. Olavi Maru, interviewer. Nov. 3, 1976. American Bar
Foundation Oral History Program. Visited May 28, 2001 http://www.abf.sociolegal.
org/oralhistory/welpton.html [hereinafter Welpton Interview].
25. See, e.g., McCalpin Interview, supra note 20, at 9-11 (describing behind the
scenes effort to restrict committee authority to draft revised rules on group legal
services and referring to the General Practice Section as "our bete noir" on the issue);
see also Vorhees Interview, supra note 20, at 24-27 (describing Unauthorized Practice
Committee's opposition to group legal services as almost fanatical and discussing how
this committee joined forces with the Committee on Economics of the Bar, which saw
group legal services as a threat to the American system, and with the large and strong
General Practice Section which opposed many innovations).
26. See Welpton Interview, supra note 24, at 18; Wright Interview, supra note 22.
27. See 1969 Reports of the ABA House of Delegates Meeting 34-37 (Aug. 12,
1969) [hereinafter ABA Hearings] (Introductory Remarks of Edward L. Wright)
(proposing adoption of Code).
28. Welpton Interview, supra note 24, at 19.
29. DR 2-101 Recommendation of Professional Employment reads, in part:
(D) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or group that furnishes,
pays for, or recommends legal services to promote the use of his
[Vol. 70
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lawyers registered objections to these provisions, with organized
opposition led by the General Practice Section and others.' When
the opposition threatened to defeat the entire code revision, the
Wright Committee had a change of heart." The Proposed Final
Draft, issued in July 1969, contained compromise language that
originated with former Supreme Court Justice Charles Whitaker,
perhaps the most conservative member of the Wright Committee. 2
Proposed DR 2-103(D)(5) allowed limited use of lawyer referral
services, and
[A]ny other non-profit organization that recommends, furnishes, or
pays for legal services to its members or beneficiaries, but only in
those instances and to the extent that controlling constitutional
interpretation at the time of the rendition of the services requires
the allowance of such legal service activities, and [subject to
specified restrictive conditions] only if the following conditions,
unless prohibited by such interpretation, are met:
(a) The primary purposes of such organization do not include the
rendition of legal services.
services or those of his partners or associates. However, he may in a
dignified manner cooperate in the offering of legal services by any of
the following:
(3) A professional association, trade association, labor union, or other
bona fide, non-profit organization which, as an incident to its
primary activities, furnishes, pays for, or recommends legal services
to its members or beneficiaries.
Code of Prof'1 Responsibility DR 2-101 (D)(3)(Prelim. Draft, Jan. 1969).
DR 2-102 Suggestion of Need of Legal Services reads, in part:
(A) A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should
obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment
resulting from that advice, except that:
(2) A lawyer may accept employment that results from participation in
activities designed to educate laymen to recognize legal problems,
to make intelligent selection of counsel, or to utilize available legal
services if such activities are operated or sponsored by:
(c) A professional association, trade association, labor union, or
other bona fide, non-profit organization which, as an incident
to its primary activities, furnishes, pays for, or recommends
lawyers to its members or beneficiaries.
(3) A lawyer who is furnished or paid by any of the following
organizations may represent a member or beneficiary thereof:
(c) A professional association, trade association, labor union, or
other bona fide, non-profit organization which as an incident
to its primary activities, pays for legal service furnished to its
members or beneficiaries.
DR 2-102 (A)(2)(c), (3)(c) (Prelim. Draft. Jan. 1969).
30. Wright Interview, supra note 22, at 25-6; Vorhees Interview, supra note 20, at
24-27.
31. See Carrington Interview, supra note 20, at 37 (expressing his opinion that the
Wright Committee's view "on this controversial subject was being dictated largely by
a fear that opponents [to group legal services] ... might destroy their entire Code").
32. Welpton Interview, supra note 24, at 20-21.
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(b) The recommending, furnishing, or paying for legal services to its
members is incidental and reasonably related to the primary
purposes of such organization.
(c) Such organization does not derive a financial benefit from the
rendition of legal services by the lawyer.
(d) The member or beneficiary for whom the legal services are
rendered, and not such organization, is recognized as the client
of the lawyer in that matter.33
Group legal services was the only issue seriously debated by the
House of Delegates when it considered the Code's adoption at the
1969 Annual Meeting held in Dallas, Texas. 4 Chairman Wright
moved for its adoption, acknowledging it was not flawless, but was the
product of conciliation and compromise. Speaking on behalf of the
Availability Committee, William McCalpin argued the Code proposal
on group legal services was "unsuitable and inadequate."36 It was
practically unworkable, gave no affirmative guidance for the lawyer
seeking to avoid discipline, and was an invitation for more judicial
intervention in professional regulation.37 In its place, he moved for
adoption of his committee's alternative, which began with the premise
that lawyers' exclusive license to practice law creates a high obligation
to make legal services readily available to all, subject only to
safeguards necessary to protect a clearly defined public interest."
Accordingly, the substitute language (later known as the "McCalpin
Amendment") was advanced to replace the Wright Committee's
restrictive and constitutionally uncertain standard with a detailed
scheme of disclosure and regulation tailored to protect the legitimate
public interest.39
Lively debate ensued. Philadelphia lawyer William J. Fuchs spoke
out for independent general practitioners, whose interests were
represented by the large and powerful ABA General Practice
Section.4" The section, which he chaired, received an "outpouring of
33. R.W. Nahstoll, Limitations of Group Legal Services Arrangements Under the
Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-103 (D)(5): Stale Wine in New Bottles, 48
Tex. L. Rev. 334, 344-45 (1970) (reproducing the text of the Proposed Final Draft).
34. See ABA Hearings, supra note 27.
35. Id. at 44.
36. Id. at 52-53.
37. Id. at 61-62.
38. Id. at 58.
39. Id. at 56-59; see Nahstoll, supra note 33, at 348-49 (reproducing text of
McCalpin Amendment); see also Carrington Interview, supra note 20, at 39-41
(restating proposal).
40. Although Fuchs was part of a large firm, several persons interviewed as part of
the ABF Oral History Project surmised that he felt obliged to look out for "poor
members of the bar" in order to gain prominence and positions of bar leadership. See,
e.g., Vorhees Interview, supra note 20, at 30; Wright Interview, supra note 22, at 12-
13.
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opinion" that "overwhelmingly... opposed ... the McCalpin
committee proposal for expanding group legal services."' He
identified various evils that would follow from group legal services,
with their "fundamental objection" being that "the laymen will run
the practice and not the lawyers .... "'I
Loss of the independence of the bar, loss of the traditional client-
lawyer relationship, the encroachment of advertising, solicitation
and the morals of the marketplace, a reduction in the quality of legal
services. If there is some great unfulfilled need of the middle or
lower income public for more legal services, the general practitioner
says, "Let us try to provide for this need, not by choking our
traditional system and concepts but by improving them and make a
positive approach to this problem [if] it exists. Let's make our
traditional system work. 4 3
These lofty ethical ideals were belied by Fuch's suggested
alternatives that protected general practitioners' economic interests,
including expanded lawyer referral and open panel legal insurance
plans.'
Former ABA President Chesterfield Smith, who served on the
Availability Committee, undoubtedly stirred some laughter, if not
support, for his position. Like Sancho, Don Quixote's sidekick in the
popular play, "Man of La Mancha," Smith acknowledged the
McCalpin amendment was a lost cause. 5  He contended that
opponents spread "heifer dust" over the issue, claiming the
amendment expanded group legal services when it really only
regulated them.4  Amidst the folksy charm, Smith challenged the
Wright committee, which he thought had succumbed to the political
demands of those hoping to ignore the Supreme Court decisions. The
ABA must come to terms with the reality, that group legal services
are constitutionally protected: "if we don't want unbridled group
legal services [we] must intelligently regulate [them] by pointing out
the evils which are legitimate and proper for us to protect."' 7
Tones of economic protectionism resonated in the comments by a
representative of the Illinois State Bar Association, who described the
shocking possibilities of the amendment:
[I]t could encourage every large business corporation with a nudge
perhaps from the union at the bargaining table for more fringe
benefits, to furnish legal services which conceivably could include
the writing of wills, the probating of estates, and the writing of
41. ABA Hearings, supra note 27, at 65-66.
42. Id at 66.
43. Id at 66-67.
44. Id at 67-68.
45. Id. at 69.
46. Id. at 69,74.
47. Id at 78.
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contracts to the employees of the corporation and their families
through a staff of lawyers employed and paid by that corporation.
[It] would also encourage manufacturers associations, unions, farm
bureaus, any kind of trade association to employ a staff of lawyers
and to advertise to its members the availability of the services
thereby provided by that lay agency.
[It] would encourage the organization of lay groups for the express
and sole purpose of furnishing legal services....
Most shocking of all, if this amendment were adopted, it would
permit any lawyer employed by the lay agency who has given advice
to a layman in the performance of the lawyer's duties for that group,
then to accept employment and fees from that layman.
These proposals, if adopted, in the view of many of us, would simply
enrich lawyers who happen to be well-connected with trade
associations or who might be aggressive enough, shall we say, to
participate covertly in formation of a group; but this is not likely to
provide better services to the modest income group which they
purport to serve.48
Apparently, the horror of such possibilities was not that they
harmed potential clients or the public interest, but rather that such
group arrangements might preclude other lawyers from serving those
middle income clients. Arthur Leibold, representing the liberal
Chicago Council of Lawyers, closed the debate with a colorful
challenge to have a forward-looking attitude and not a wistful longing
for return to the nineteenth century: "I am fearful... [that] the
general public.., will think we have turned a part of our anatomy,
which is of great utilitarian value, but is not aesthetically appealing."4 9
The House of Delegates soundly defeated the McCalpin
amendment, and approved the Code as recommended by the Wright
committee. 0 A new committee was promptly formed to encourage
adoption by local jurisdictions. Midway through the adoption process,
the Supreme Court again reaffirmed the broad constitutional
protection for union legal service plans." Legal commentators singled
48. Id. at 80-81, 83.
49. Id. at 85; see also Olavi Maru, Am. B. Found., Research on the Legal
Profession: A Review of Work Done 59-64 (1986) (describing Chicago Council as a
liberal bar organization). Maru's book is an extraordinary compilation that describes
and evaluates existing sociological and historical research on the legal profession,
including numerous unpublished manuscripts.
50. ABA Hearings, supra note 27, at 88.
51. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
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out DR 2-105(D)(5) for harsh criticism.' Although many jurisdictions
adopted the Code verbatim, as recommended by the ABA, a
substantial number revised or omitted the controversial provisions on
group legal services.53
For the life of the Code, amendments to the group legal services
provisions attracted more attention and controversy than any others.?
By the time the ABA held its 1974 midyear meeting in Houston, there
was a general consensus that an amendment was necessary."
Nevertheless, sharp divisions remained on the substance of the
amendment, specifically, whether to adopt uniform standards
applicable to both closed and open plans, or to tighten regulations on
those which were closed. 6 The Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility proposed regulations equally applicable to
all group legal services.' Once again, the General Practice Section
offered a proposal that was hostile to group services, especially closed
plans.58 Once again, its position prevailed, but by a narrow margin? 9
The so-called "Houston amendments" substituted the hopelessly
uncertain reference to controlling constitutional interpretations with
detailed and discriminatory restrictions on closed panel plans.
Although, in theory, the amendments allowed closed panels, by design
they sought to evade the Supreme Court decisions, making them
practically unfeasible.' Use of lawyer referral services was essentially
limited to open panel plans, foreclosing options that could shut out
unaffiliated general practitioners from a prospective client base. The
most outrageous provision, "totally devoid of ethical objectives,"
according to one commentator, required that, if a member of a closed
panel plan chose to hire an outside attorney, the plan must reimburse
the member for the amount those services would have cost the plan if
provided internally.62 Commentary promptly labeled this a method to
limit closed panels, which were conceptually premised on "economies
52. See Nahstoll, supra note 33 (providing acerbic criticism by a former member of
the Availability Committee); Smith, supra note 6, at 285 (predicting greatest
controversy over Canon 2, and likelihood of early amendment to DR 2-103(D)).
53. ABA Special Comm. to Secure Adoption of the Code of Prof'l Responsibility,
Report and Recommendation (August, 1972) (copy on file with the Fordhamn Law
Review) (listing fourteen states that varied from ABA treatment on group legal
services).
54. Olavi Maru, Am. B. Found., Annotated Code of Prof'l Responsibility 70
(1979).
55. See J. Robert Kramer II, Note, Group Legal Services: From Houston to
Chicago, 79 Dick. L. Rev. 621,622-23 (1975).
56. Id. at 623.
57. Id
58. Id.
59. Id. (stating vote as 144-117).
60. Maru, supra note 54, at 74-75.
61. Kramer, supra note 55, at 633.
62. Id. at 633-36, 644 (reproducing the Houston Amendment to DR 2-
103(D)(5)(a)(v)).
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of scale and minimum use of personnel through specialization."6
They required closed, but not open, plans to file extensive annual
reports with the applicable state disciplinary authority.' Further
details of the lengthy Houston amendments need not be addressed.
Suffice it to say that they were roundly criticized inside and out of the
bar, including by consumer groups, labor unions and the Department
of Justice.6" Obvious economic protectionism by the organized bar
raised serious questions about the legitimacy of self-regulation.66
Antitrust and constitutional considerations loomed large.67
Because of the vocal criticism, no state adopted the Houston
Amendments in the six months before the next meeting.6' At the
Honolulu Annual Meeting, the House of Delegates authorized a
special Ad Hoc Study Group to re-evaluate.69 At the Chicago 1975
midyear meeting, just a year after the maligned Houston
Amendments, the House unanimously voted to replace them."' The
new provisions in the Chicago Amendments generally applied to all
group legal services, whether or not the plan was open. Attorneys
could represent plan members on non-plan matters, so long as they
did not engage in prohibited solicitation.7" Both types of plans had to
file annual reports.72 Other discriminatory burdens imposed only on
closed panel plans were eliminated.73 The Chicago Amendments
remained in force, essentially unchanged, for the life of the Code.74
Several path-breaking scholarly works helped to improve the
political climate for group legal services. During the 1960s, Elliott
Cheatham wrote several articles that influenced the Wright
63. Id. at 636.
64. Id. at 636, 644 (reproducing the Houston Amendment to DR 2-
103(D)(5)(a)(viii)).
65. See McCalpin Interview, supra note 20, at 15 (calling "horrible" the General
Practice Section substitute amendment adopted by House of Delegates);
Memorandum from John V. Tunney, Chairman, U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
Representation of Citizen Interests, to State and Local Bar Ass'ns, re Revisions to the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility 2-3, 11, 14 (May 28, 1974), cited in Kramer,
supra note 55, at 623 nn.14-19.
66. Kramer, supra note 55, at 623.
67. McCalpin Interview, supra note 20, at 14.
68. Kramer, supra note 55, at 623.
69. Id. at 624; see also Maru, supra note 54, at 75; McCalpin Interview, supra note
20, at 15.
70. Kramer, supra note 55, at 624; see also Maru, supra note 54, at 75.
71. Code of Profl Responsibility DR 2-104 (A)(3) (1975); Kramer, supra note 55,
at 639.
72. DR 2-103(D)(4)(g); Kramer, supra note 55, at 640.
73. Kramer, supra note 55, at 639-40 (concerning deleted provision requiring that
closed panel plans be incidental, but reasonably related to large non-legal parent
organizations); see also id. at 640 (discussing new DR 2-103(D)(4)(e), requiring that a
plan "provide appropriate relief" and "appropriate procedure" where any plan
member or beneficiary obtains outside assistance because counsel furnished by a plan
could not ethically or competently render service).
74. Maru, supra note 54, at 75.
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committee's thinking about Canon 2 and the professional duty to
make legal services more available to the middle class." The ABA
Availability Committee and the American Bar Foundation supported
important research projects by Barlow Christensen"b and Preble
Stolz.' The ABA Committee to Survey Legal Needs, appointed in
1971, collaborated with the American Bar Foundation to produce the
first major empirical study on legal needs of the public. 7' Project
Director Barbara Curran worked with a team of social scientists to
construct and implement a sophisticated research methodology,
including personal interviews with a sample of more than two
thousand people.79 In 1977, the Committee released the final report
of the national survey. Consultation with a lawyer was found to vary
based on the incidence and type of problem, patterns of problem
solving associated with types of situations, and some demographic
differences that related to variable exposure to risk.' Thereafter, a
Yale Law Journal Student Project statistically analyzed the raw data
supplied by the ABF, finding that lawyer use primarily depended
upon three variables: how often an individual experienced legal
problems, ownership of real property and personal acquaintance with
a lawyer.8' The Project encouraged preventive legal services and the
use of alternative delivery systems, which would enhance contacts
with lawyers.' Regarding group legal services, the Project argued for
expanded use of prepaid, closed-panel arrangements, which would
maximize the legal information to members, at the "lowest search
cost" to locate an attorney.8-'
75. See, e.g., Cheatham, supra note 17.
76. See Barlow F. Christensen, Am. B. Found., Lawyers for People of Moderate
Means: Some Problems of Availability of Legal Services viii (1970) (collecting papers
prepared for Availability Committee); Christensen, supra note 13, at 229.
Christensen's research was based on extensive, systematic observation, not technically
described as empirical, but rather analytical and polemical.
77. Preble Stolz, Insurance for Legal Services: A Preliminary Study of Feasibility
35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 417, 422 (1968) (comparing proposals for legal expense insurance
to medical insurance; legal insurance is more a device to prepay or budget legal
expenses than one to pool risk of heavy losses).
78. Barbara A. Curran, ABA Special Comm. to Survey Legal Needs & Am. B.
Found., The Legal Needs of the Public: The Final Report of a National Survey 9
(1977) (defining central purpose "to determine the circumstances under which the
public seeks the advice or help of lawyers and to identify factors that appear to
influence... [whether or not] to consult lawyers").
79. Id at 15-52 (describing survey design and implementation).
80. Id. at 260-64. Some interview questions focused specifically on prepaid legal
insurance, which was sufficiently novel at the time to require detailed explanations
before obtaining respondents' views on the issues. Id. at 31. Results were discussed in
a preliminary report. Id. at 48 n.64.
81. Russell Pearce et al., Project, An Assessment of Alternative Strategies for
Increasing Access to Legal Services, 90 Yale L. J. 122, 143-45, 153-54 (1980).
82. Id at 147.
83. Id. at 151-52.
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2. Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1977-present)
Various factors combined to underscore serious difficulties with the
Code of Professional Responsibility.8' In 1977, ABA President
William B. Spann, Jr. appointed the Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards, named the "Kutak Commission," after its
chair Robert J. Kutak. Its initial efforts at private deliberation and
visionary thinking were thwarted when Monroe Freedman publicly
released the Preliminary Draft. 5 Loud controversy swirled about
proposed exceptions to confidentiality and mandatory pro bono. 6
By contrast, there was no advance, vocal opposition to the Kutak
Commission's proposed Rule 5.4, although it could have profoundly
shaped future law practice.' Modeled after a California rule, it would
have allowed lawyers to be employed by any kind of organization,
provided that such organizations 1) did not interfere with lawyers'
independent professional judgment; 2) protected client confidences; 3)
complied with advertising and solicitation restrictions; and 4) charged
only reasonable fees.18 Strong opposition surfaced at the last minute,
when the rule was considered by the House of Delegates at the
February 1983 midyear meeting. Of all the commission's final
proposals, it alone "suffer[ed] total rejection at the hands of the
delegates."89 Opposition to the draft and the substitute amendment
came from the General Practice Section, whose vehement opposition
to group legal services played such a pivotal role in the 1969 Code
revision process.90 Critics argued that the Kutak proposal was an
unwarranted, significant departure from existing law, and that profit
motivations of nonlawyers with ownership interests in a law practice
would undermine ethical considerations and not be subject to
regulation.9' The section's floor amendment instead proposed
retaining the strict rule banning nonlawyer intermediaries, taken
verbatim from the old Code. Debate ended when it was conceded
that the Commission proposal would allow Sears, Roebuck to open a
84. See Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers' Pro Bono
Responsibilities 41 (July 26, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 915 (1986).
88. Id. (discussing Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 5.4 (Proposed Final Draft,
May 30, 1981)). California had pioneered studies and experiments in group legal
services during the 1950s and 1960s. See Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Regulation
of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards 301 (2000) (detailing progression from 1980
Discussion Draft, to 1981 Proposed Final Draft, 1982 Draft, and version finally
adopted by House of Delegates).
89. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 45.2
(3d ed. 2001).
90. Gillers & Simon, supra note 88; see supra text accompanying notes 30-66.
91. ABA, A Legislative History: The Development of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 1982-1998, at 236-37 (1999) [hereinafter ABA Model Rules
Legislative History].
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law office.' As finally adopted, Rule 5.4 flatly prohibits partnerships
with non-lawyers where any of the firm activities involve legal
practice.93 The General Practice Section acknowledged that the rule
"allowed for experimentation in methods of delivering legal
services. '
Geoffrey Hazard, Reporter to the Kutak Commission and co-
author of the respected treatise, Law of Lawyering, strongly criticized
Rule 5.4.19 Other provisions adequately addressed the legitimate
professional concerns, such as avoiding unauthorized practice and
impermissible marketing activities, and preserving client confidences
and independent professional judgment." Rule 5.3 required that
lawyers monitor nonlawyer personnel, to ensure their conduct is
compatible with the lawyers' professional obligations.' When
someone other than the client pays a lawyer's fee, Rule 1.8(f) required
client consent, protection of confidential information and non-
interference with the client-lawyer relationship and the lawyer's
independent professional judgment."' By adopting a broad
prophylactic rule banning nonlawyer involvement where a narrow
rule would have sufficed, the House of Delegates revealed that
illegitimate economic protectionism was decisive."
3. Ethics Opinions under the Rules
Restrictions on form of practice, advertising and solicitation
presented continuing albeit more limited obstacles to expansion of
prepaid and group legal services."° Over time, as the organized bar
became more comfortable with innovative referral and delivery
systems, the restrictions were relaxed. Several local and ABA ethics
92. Geoffrey C. Hazard, et al., The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 1041 (3d ed.
1999) (citing David Kaplan, Want to Invest in a Law Firm?, Nat'l. L.J., Jan. 19, 1987,
at 28); cf ABA Model Rules Legislative History, supra note 91, at 237; Roger C.
Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 Case W. Res. L Rev.
531, 576 (1994) (stating continued alarm of profession to offering legal services
through "national retailers, insurance companies and major banks").
93. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 5.4 (1997) (containing Code Comparison
that describes provisions as "substantially identical" with applicable Code
predecessors).
94. ABA Model Rules Legislative History, supra note 91, at 237. For example,
Rule 7.2 comments recognized that lawyers could provide services under the auspices
of a legal services plan that advertised, and could pay customary fees charged by not-
for-profit lawyer referral programs. R. 7.2 cmt.
95. Hazard & Hodes, supra note 89, §§ 45.2-45.10.
96. Id.
97. R. 5.3; Hazard & Hodes, supra note 89, § 45.2.
98. R. 1.8(f); Hazard & Hodes, supra note 89, § 45.2 (preventing lawyer from
tailoring representation for paymaster).
99. Hazard & Hodes, supra note 89, § 45.6.
100. Cramton, supra note 92, at 576-77; Telephone Interview with Alec Schwartz,
Director of American Prepaid Legal Services Institute (API), ABA affiliate (June 21,
2001) [hereinafter Schwartz Interview].
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opinions in the mid-1980s marked a crucial turning point for the
concept of prepaid legal services, subject to compliance with other
ethical obligations. 101 ABA Informal Opinion 85-1510 determined
that the Model Rules permitted lawyer participation in a for-profit
lawyer referral service, as long as the lawyer did not pay a fee or share
legal fees with the service.0 2 The watershed was reached in ABA
Formal Opinion 87-355, which allowed participation with any for-
profit prepaid legal service plan that complied with other provisions of
the Model Rules.03 Ethics opinions seek to interpret existing rules, do
not purport to have the force of law, and are often criticized by
commentators for addressing unimportant, peripheral questions.10' In
light of the tortured regulatory history surrounding group legal
services, however, these ethics opinions are significant because they
endorse prepaid legal services plans without imposing heavy
restrictions on them. Since professional self-regulation is infused with
economic protectionism, the opinions reflect a notable shift in the
organized bar's receptivity to group legal services.
ABA Formal Opinion 87-355 recognized increased interest in the
subject of group services plans, noting the proliferation of various
plans and their value to improving access to legal services.
Accordingly, the opinion identified criteria and general guidelines for
evaluating when involvement was permitted under the Rules."
Because the Committee's authority was limited, it could only analyze
the broad factual questions under its interpretation of the Model
Rules. Legislative history surrounding adoption of Rule 5.4 was
significant, because it contemplated future experiments in delivery
systems. Reminiscent of the rejected Kutak proposal, the opinion
outlined five principal ethical concerns: independent judgment,
101. Besides the ABA ethics opinions, some local jurisdictions also endorsed the
concept of prepaid legal services. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 170
[1986], 2 Law. Manual on Prof'l Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 13, at 120 (July 23, 1986);
Neb. State Bar Ass'n Advisory Comm., Op. 86-2 [1986], 2 Law. Manual on Prof'l
Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 13, at 120 (July 23, 1986) (allowing participation with legal
services plan, conditioned on compliance with other ethics rules).
102. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 85-1510 (1985)
(concluding specific proposal was allowed under Model Rules, but not Model Code,
because for-profit corporation did not qualify as a permitted legal services
organization under DR 2-103(D)(4)(a)); cf ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Informal Op. 85-1512 (1985) (finding it permissible under both the
Model Rules and the Model Code to participate in a religious organization's not-for-
profit lawyer referral program).
103. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-355 (1987).
104. Wolfram, supra note 87, § 2.6.6; see also Lawrence K. Hellman, When "Ethics
Rules" Don't Mean What They Say: The Implications of Strained ABA Ethics
Opinions, 10 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 317, 336 (1996) (criticizing ABA formal opinions
for not supporting the text they purport to interpret).
105. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-355 (1987).
The Standing Committee acts under limited authority to answer questions of pressing
importance, interpreting how the applicable ethical rules would apply to that
situation.
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confidences, conflicts, competence and marketing. The requirement
of maintaining lawyers' independent professional judgment, embodied
in Rule 5.4, was most important to the Committee. After referring a
plan member to a lawyer, the plan sponsor should have no further
dealings with the member on legal issues, the opinion cautioned.
Thereafter, a traditional client-lawyer relationship would exist
between the member and providing lawyer. Despite the inherent
potential for sponsors to exercise economic control over participating
lawyers, Rule 5.4(c) requires careful attention to the precise
relationship so that the lawyer's financial dependence does not affect
professional judgment. Thus, the plan should not impose limits on the
time permitted on each matter, fix a minimum caseload or restrict the
permissible scope of representation. To the extent plans provided
legal services through its employees, or through independent counsel,
unauthorized practice issues could arise.
The remaining concerns of confidentiality, conflicts, competence
and marketing received brief attention in the opinion. Quality control
mechanisms that involved disclosure of confidential information were
unacceptable. Plan restrictions could not supercede the applicable
conflicts of interest provisions in the Model Rules. Although the plan
could preclude subsidized actions against the plan sponsor or its
members, in such cases the lawyer should advise the client to seek
outside counsel. Referrals must be only in areas of the lawyer's
competence, in terms of both expertise and workload. At the time,
Rule 7.3 contained an absolute ban on solicitation for pecuniary
gain. 6 As applied to group legal services, the Committee found that
Rule 7.3 prohibited a lawyer's involvement with a plan engaging a
sales force that solicited members by phone or in-person. Following
the Supreme Court's decision in Shapero v. Kentucky State Bar, in
1989 the House of Delegates amended Rule 7.3, effectively overruling
that aspect of Formal Opinion 87-355 and allowing attorneys to
participate in such plans. Finally, the Committee addressed financial
issues between the plan and the lawyer/provider. In the typical
prepaid plan, the subscriber pays a monthly fee that covers overhead
(including both administrative costs and payments to participating
106. This ban was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Shapero v.
Kentucky State Bar, 486 U.S. 466 (1988), prompting substantial revision of the rule in
1989. As amended, ABA Rule 7.3(d) allows lawyers to participate ith prepaid or
group legal service plans that use in-person or telephone contact to solicit
memberships from persons not known to need specific types of legal services. These
marketing activities are allowed, providing the organization is neither owned nor
directed by any lawyer who participates in providing plan services. Model Rules of
Prof'l Conduct R. 7.3 (1997). Thus, a lawyer may not "create an organization
controlled directly or indirectly by the lawyer and use the organization for the in-
person or telephone solicitation of legal employment of the lawyer through
memberships in the plan or otherwise." Id. cmt. The amendment passed by voice
vote, indicating the House was not closely divided. ABA Model Rules Legislative
History, supra note 91, at 310.
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lawyers) and profit. The plan sponsor compensates the lawyer for
agreeing to render legal services to subscribers in accordance with its
terms, and the lawyer does not compensate the plan, so the
arrangement did not violate the Rule 7.2(c) prohibition against giving
something of value in exchange for recommending the lawyer's
services. Side-stepping the issue of whether the monthly fee was
tantamount to advance payment of legal fees, the opinion found the
arrangement did not involve prohibited fee sharing with nonlawyers
because the evils of compromised independence and unreasonably
high fees were absent. Despite possible criticism for its circular
reasoning, Formal Opinion 87-355 supported emerging forms of
prepaid group legal services, creating a friendlier climate for their
further development.
4. Subsequent Reform Efforts
In recent years, ethics reformers have unsuccessfully tried to loosen
the strictures on nonlawyer intermediaries. The ABA revisited issues
of nonlawyer involvement in its debates on multidisciplinary
("MDP") practice. After extensive study and hearings, the ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice recommended far-reaching
proposals that would allow partnerships between lawyers and
nonlawyers for delivery of multiple types of services, provided the
nonlawyers deferred to the rules of legal ethics."W By a three-to-one
margin, at the 2000 Annual Meeting in New York, the House of
Delegates dealt a crushing blow to MDP proponents, adopting instead
a substitute measure reaffirming "core values" of the legal
profession."° Resolution 1OF authorized the Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility to assess the need for further
amendments regarding strategic alliances and side-by-side
partnerships between nonlawyers and lawyers. 0 9
Since 1998, the ABA 2000 Ethics Commission has been evaluating
whether the Model Rules need further amendments in light of
developments in the law and ethics of lawyering. Because the MDP
Commission functioned concurrently, there was no serious
reconsideration of Rule 5.4. Debate in the House of Delegates on the
Ethics 2000 final report and recommendations is underway." 0
Compared to the earlier rancorous debates on group legal services,
the plans are now almost a non-issue. Pre-paid legal insurance and
107. Gillers & Simon, supra note 88, at 304.
108. Conference Report, ABA Annual Meeting, 69 L.W. 2042-43 (July 18, 2000);
John Gibeaut, Your ABA/Annual Meeting Report, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2000, at 92.
109. ABA Comm'n on Evaluation of the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Chair's
Introduction and Executive Summary 7, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-
report.html (last visited June 13, 2001) [hereinafter Ethics 2000 Comm'n].
110. The ABA House of Delegates began consideration at the 2001 Annual
Meeting and may complete its work at the 2002 Midyear Meeting.
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group legal services are a fact of life, accepted by the organized bar
with a degree of benign indifference." The American Prepaid Legal
Services Institute ("API"), affiliated with the ABA, is a national
umbrella organization committed to advancing the development of
prepaid legal services. 112  Only one proposed amendment is
specifically directed to group legal services, Rule 7.2(b)(2), which
would allow lawyers to pay fees to legal service plans and other
approved qualified lawyer referral services, including for-profit
plans. 3
II. PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES INDUSTRY TODAY
A. An Idea Whose Time Has Come? Success in the Marketplace
The organized bar's earlier intransigence towards group legal
services is now gone. Since 1983, the ABA has officially encouraged
the development of prepaid legal service plans, providing increased
levels of support and endorsement."' In a poll taken fifteen years
ago, two-thirds of lawyers approved of prepaid plans, and more than
half were willing to participate as service providers.' Subsequent
changes in the economy and competition within the legal profession
have further kindled lawyers' interest in such plans as an effective way
to expand business.' 6 What was once scorned in horror has now
become commonplace." 7 The number of Americans covered by some
type of prepaid legal plan has blossomed from an estimated 13 million
in 1987118 to 152 million in 2000.119 Despite some mixed reviews from
participants,120 prepaid plans are considered by some "an idea whose
time may have arrived' 2' and "the wave of the future."'-"
111. Schwartz Interview, supra note 100.
112. Am. Prepaid Legal Serv. Inst., Who's Who in Prepaid Legal Services:
Membership Directory 2 (2000) (describing API mission as nonprofit membership
organization created in 1975 to aid development of prepaid legal services).
113. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 7.2(b)(2) & cmt. (1997); Ethics 2000
Comm'n, supra note 109. API supported this amendment, and a new Rule 1.18,
regarding duties to prospective clients. Schwartz Interview, supra note 100.
114. Nancy Blodgett, Prepaid Plans, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1987, at 40 (stating that the
1983 House Delegates passed a resolution encouraging development of prepaid
plans).
115. Lauren Rubenstein Reskin, Lawyers Like Sohtion to High Cost of Legal
Services, 72 A.B.A. J., Mar. 1986, at 42 (quoting Alec M. Schwartz stating that
younger lawyers were more likely to approve of plans, and, not surprisingly, lawyers
in higher income brackets were less inclined to participate).
116. Jennifer Dahlgren, Consulting the Future, A.B.A. J. Apr. 1994, at 76 (noting
national economic slump and competition for legal business causing renewed
attention).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44, 47-48 (comments by representatives
of General Practice Section and Illinois State Bar Association).
118. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 43.
119. NRCCLS website, supra note 4, at 3 fig.4.
120. Thomas M. Domer, Expanding Your Practice Using Group and Prepaid Legal
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The numbers can be deceiving, however. Included in the 152 million
are 86 million people who are eligible to use "free plans" or "access
plans" to which lawyer referral services and limited legal advice are
provided as a routine membership benefit for large umbrella groups
like the AFL-CIO, AARP and NEA. 23 Enrollment in free plans is
provided automatically to group members, without additional cost.
Similarly, many employers offer "employee assistance plans"
("EAPs"), which include a variety of personal support programs,
including lawyer referrals and free telephone consultation on certain
matters. Forty million people are considered "covered" by EAPs.
For both free plans and EAPs, the cost to sponsoring organizations is
low, as is degree of coverage and utilization by members.'24
In some respects these plans may be considered analogous to
"preferred provider" medical insurance. For example, service
providers must agree to terms specified by the sponsor, and plan
members receive coverage only by obtaining services from a limited
number of approved service providers. Legal services plans differ
from preferred provider plans, however, in that they operate primarily
as lawyer referral services and do not charge members for such limited
benefits. Despite their relatively low usage, these plans offer some
efficiencies to middle income consumers who do not otherwise have
legal representation, by reducing the high costs of searching for a
competent attorney willing to provide services at specified rates. The
plans are useful because they provide advance screening for
experience in listed practice areas, and impose some cost controls and
quality control mechanisms." s  Assuming that these are common
attributes of free plans, they may enhance the consumer welfare of
moderate-income clients through quality and price control
mechanisms, as well as through malpractice insurance coverage. From
Services, Wis. Law., Nov. 1989, at 10 (noting concerns that growth is at a standstill).
121. Dahlgren, supra note 116, at 77.
122. Jill Schachner Chanen, Best Prepaid Plans Can Go Awry, 86 A.B.A. J., May
2000, at 64 (quoting Karma Rodgers, of Rodgers & Johnson in Milwaukee).
123. NRCCLS website, supra note 4, at 7 fig.12 ("Largest Free Plans") (indicating
that there are forty million members of Union Plus Legal Service, sponsored by AFL-
CIO and its member unions, twenty million with access to Elder Hotlines, thirteen
million members of Association of Retired Persons Legal Services Network, and five
million members of National Education Association). The costs of obtaining
coverage under "access legal plans" are nominal. See API Technical Assistance Series
7 (1999) (stating that the individual member cost is three dollars per month, and
group price is ten to fifty cents per month, depending on size of group).
124. NRCCLS website, supra note 4, at 9 fig.15 ("Summary of Plan Characteristics
by Type of Plan").
125. See, e.g., Mark Hansen, The Legal World According to AARP: Lawyers
joining retiree discount program must undergo screening, pay fee, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1997,
at 34 (stating requirements for lawyers to participate in AARP plan, including
current malpractice insurance, four years experience in each listed practice area,
screening and personal interview with established local lawyer, agreement to
performance evaluations and to pay fee to sponsoring organization).
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an economic standpoint, the private plans affect the legal marketplace
in ways that the self-regulated legal profession has been unable to
accomplish. Depending on the plan details, they might result in
meaningful cost savings to clients. 2 6
In contrast to free plans, enrollment in true prepaid legal service
plans is far more limited, reaching 17.8 million people.2" Employer-
paid programs cover 7.6 million Americans, with Hyatt Legal Plans
and the United Auto Workers being the largest providers.'"
Enrollment is automatic for eligible employees as a part of their
employment benefit package, with premiums paid based on the
number of employees and terms of coverage. Some employer-paid
plans offer limited legal services, while others are comprehensive in
scope. "Comprehensive" legal service plans, similar to employer-paid
health insurance, provide a wide variety of services at no additional
charge to the client."9 Additional legal services are provided at a
discount. For a relatively moderate cost to the employer, members
receive significant coverage for their legal expenses."'
Since 1994, participation in employer-paid plans has remained
constant. By contrast, participation in plans subsidized by payroll
deductions or individual subscriptions has increased moderately.31
Currently, approximately 2.4 million Americans participate in prepaid
plan coverage through payroll deductions while another 3.5 million
purchase individual coverage, at costs ranging from fifteen to twenty-
five dollars per month.3 2 The group payroll deduction plans are being
marketed as "feel-good benefits" that cost employers almost nothing.
Whereas employees would scoff at the prospect of a fifteen dollar
monthly pay increase, that is all it could take to obtain legal insurance
for a moderate size workforce. 3
126. See Wolfram, supra note 87, § 16.5.3 (stating that the limited access services by
some plans may serve as "loss leaders," with fees for uncovered services perhaps
higher than "community averages for comparable services").
127. NRCCLS website. supra note 4, at 3 fig.5 (stating that this number includes
persons covered as dependents, and those with duplicate coverage); see also id. at 2
fig.2 (indicating that there is duplicate coverage of thirty-four million people, mostly
in union households, AARP members, members of armed forces, employees of large
companies or government).
128. NRCCLS website, supra note 4, at 5 fig.8. UAW is the largest such provider,
serving more than two million participants. Id.
129. Debra Cassens Moss, Prepaid Glossary, A.B.A. J., May 1988, at 38.
130. NRCCLS website, supra note 4, at 8 fig.13, 9 fig.15.; see also id. at 8 fig.14
(reporting utilization rate as above average).
131. Id. at 4 fig.7.
132. Id. at 3 fig.5, 4 fig.7.
133. Beverly Goodman, Should You Shop for Insurance at Work?, Money Mag.,
Sept. 1999, at 172; Alec M. Schwartz, Prepaid Legal Puts Experts in the Workers'
Comer, Nat'l. Underwriter, Oct. 23, 2000, at S7 (stating that employees would pay
$100 to $300 per year to legal services plans); see also Heid & Misulovin, supra note 4,
at 338 (stating that group legal services plans are an affordable way to show concern
for employees and cost approximately three dollars per week).
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Innovations in group-based delivery of legal services are profoundly
changing the legal marketplace. Even when middle-class consumers
recognize that they might benefit from a lawyer's services, they are
reluctant to seek out legal assistance because they are concerned
about the cost of legal services and they lack the requisite knowledge
to find a competent lawyer. By 1977, when the Supreme Court
decided Bates v. Arizona, legal advertising had gained some
acceptance in the legal community as a method of enhancing access to
legal services by educating consumers about their legal rights,
overcoming price fears, and helping to match prospective clients with
competent counsel willing to undertake matters in defined practice
areas." In reality, although attorney advertising has raised consumer
awareness of legal problems, it has been less effective in alleviating
the price concerns and the matching problem. As one reporter noted,
"[L]eafing through the Yellow Pages and muttering 'eeny meeny
miney mo"' is a haphazard and unreliable method of selecting a
lawyer.' While advertising apparently yields good returns for the
lawyers, as evidenced by the amount of money spent on prominent
advertising placement, it does nothing to ensure quality performance
for the clients. A 1994 ABA study surveyed how individual
consumers found their lawyers: six percent used a lawyer referral
service, while twenty-one percent found lawyers through the Yellow
Pages or the print or electronic media. 3 6  Most often, however,
consumers were either referred to their lawyers by a friend or
contacted someone they already knew.137 At the time of the study,
only about four percent located lawyers through "other" means,
including a prepaid legal plan. Albeit somewhat dated, this data
empirically supports the common perception that most middle-class
persons still use haphazard, shot-in-the dark methods of selecting a
lawyer. Thus, there is a tremendous, unmet potential for lawyers with
entrepreneurial and managerial orientations to enlarge their client
base by participating with a reputable, well-run prepaid legal service
plan. Of course, lawyers' highest priority must be their professional
obligations, including safeguarding the client's right to quality
representation against the temptation to cut corners, or to provide
"cookie cutter" services without regard to suitability for the individual
client.
134. Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
135. David Segal, Legal HMOs: Defense Against High Fees; Consumers Embracing
Prepaid Plans, Wash. Post, Mar. 14, 1988, at D1.
136. ABA, Findings of the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study: Study Conducted
by the Inst. for Survey Research at Temple Univ. for the Consortium on Legal
Services and the Public 55 tbl.5-11 (indicating that eighteen percent of lawyers are
located through Yellow Pages while three percent are found through print or
electronic media advertisements).
137. Id. (showing that thirty-two percent of clients already knew their attorneys
while thirty-two percent were referred by a friend).
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B. Creative Tension: Professionalism, Entrepreneurship, and
Management Techniques
Standing alone, legal advertisements provide little in the way of
quality control. By contrast, the marketing of legal services through
pre-paid group plans is improving middle-class consumers' access to
competent counsel at affordable costs.s At present, these plans
appear to be winlwin solutions for both the legal profession and the
potential middle-class consumers in need of legal advice. The
developing prepaid legal services industry has drawn lessons from
both the consumer and legal services movements of earlier times.W
Blending strands of professionalism with managerial and
entrepreneurial ideology, these for-profit providers of group legal
services are commercializing the traditional concept of the legal
profession as a public calling to serve. In doing so, these providers
are transforming the goal of increasing access to legal services into a
private sector, commercial venture, and are recasting the political
symbols from the consumer movement as a marketing strategy that
emphasizes fair, reasonable and standard pricing, quality control and
customer satisfaction."4
It remains to be seen whether the plan promoters and their legal
service providers can achieve the right balance in the dynamic tension
between entrepreneurial zeal, managerial controls and lawyers'
professional judgment. Plan promoters are reaching out to expand
enrollment through direct mail and other aggressive marketing
techniques. Participating lawyers must ensure that these plans comply
with reasonable local restrictions on permissible advertising.14, Both
lawyers and providers should also be aware of other regulatory
schemes that may apply, including state insurance law, or the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").
138. Cf William Blair & Company Initiates Coverage of Pre-Paid Legal Services,
Ina With Strong Buy Rating, PR Newswire, June 22, 2001, available at
http://www.prnewswire.com.
139. Carroll Seron, Managing Entrepreneurial Legal Services: The Transformation
of Small-Firm Practice, in Lawyer's IdealsLawyer's Practices: Transformations in the
American Legal Profession 63,88-89 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
140. See generally id. at 69, 78, 87-88.
141. West Virginia St. Bar Disciplinary Board, Op. 97-03 [1997], 13 Law. Manual
on Prof'l Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 24, at 395 (Dec. 24, 1997): see Iowa Sup. Ct.
Board of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Beckman [1996], 13 Law. Manual on Prof'l
Conduct (ABAIBNA) No. 1, at 13 (Feb. 5. 1997) (lawyer disciplined for failing to
include warning language required by restrictive state rules). In return, states should
evaluate whether their regulations on lawyer marketing activities are reasonably
necessary to further important state interests in consumer welfare and access to legal
services. See In re 1115 Legal Service Care, 541 A.2d 673 (NJ. 1988) (upholding use
of legal service trade name, and directing amendment to state ethics rule, local
counterpart to ABA Model Rule 7.5).
142. Whether or not a prepaid plan is considered "insurance" is a matter of local
law, and beyond the scope of this essay. When group legal services are provided as an
employer benefit, they also may be subject to scrutiny under state law, although the
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Additionally, lawyers must be aware of the obligations they
undertake when they agree to participate in group services plans. For
example, in cases where plan promoters have not consistently
delivered on their promises, participating lawyers have become
ensnared with the disciplinary authorities. 43  Recent cases imposing
discipline on lawyers who aided the unauthorized practice of law
present genuine issues of consumer harm. Where lawyers become
closely aligned with businesses that market a certain product, such as
living wills, there is substantial risk that lawyers will abdicate
responsibility for evaluating the suitability of the product for each
client, and may summarily channel each client through the same
routine, without adequate inquiry, information or counseling.'44
Lawyers who agree to participate in such plans must retain their
professional autonomy, preserve client confidences, and provide
adequate information and legal advice necessary for the client to
make sound choices. Attorneys who negligently provide services may
be held civilly liable for damages to both the client and to the plan
itself.
145
Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1)
(1994), may preempt substantive state regulations; ERISA regulates disclosure, notice
and fiduciary responsibility of money managers. See Moran v. Rush Prudential, 230
F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (June 29, 2001); Julia Field
Costich, Joint State-Federal Regulation of Lawyers: The Case of Group Legal Services
Under ERISA, 82 Ky. L.J. 627, 630 (1993/1994); Heid & Misulovin, supra note 4:
Bogan, ERISA, supra note 2, at 7 n.24. Indeed, broad preemption language was added
to ERISA because of last-minute lobbying efforts by labor unions and employers, in
part to avoid threatened state legislation prohibiting closed panel legal service plans.
See Bogan, Protecting, supra note 2, at 983; see generally Roger D. Billings Jr., Prepaid
Legal Services (1981) (offering a somewhat dated, but still valuable comprehensive
treatment of regulations affecting prepaid legal service plans).
143. See, e.g., People v. Laden, 893 P.2d 771 (Colo. 1995) (agreeing to accept
referrals from nonlawyer seller of living trusts violated rule against aiding
unauthorized practice of law; public censure); People v. Cassidy, 884 P.2d 309 (Colo.
1994) (ordering suspension of lawyer for participating in sale of living trust packages
to customers of nonlawyer preparers); see also Patricia Manson, Suspension of
downstate lawyer sought, Chi. Daily L. Bull., June 11, 2001, at 3 (reporting
recommendation of Illinois disciplinary panel to suspend William R. Pearcy for
assisting nonlawyers in marketing of living trusts); Debra Cassens Moss, More
'American Legal' Woes: Company faces court action over its prepaid legal plan,
A.B.A. J., July 1988, at 30 (relating investor's complaint of paying $20,000 to Lawyer
Access Network ("LAN") for rights as "sole master provider" in state, and that three
others also claimed exclusive distributorship status; lawyer participants were unaware
of price caps imposed by plan).
144. See, e.g., Case file in Pearcy (on file with author) (disciplining attorney for
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law).
145. See, e.g., Stephens v. GMC, 905 P.2d 797 (Okla. 1995); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Berger,
Kahn, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon & Gladstone, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-02 (2001)
(specifying ethical obligations for lawyer working under insurance company
guidelines to protect client confidences and preserve independent professional
judgment).
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Innovative organizational structures seek ways to deliver high
quality, individualized legal services meeting the common legal needs
of middle-class clientele. 16 Providers must anticipate high volume
traffic flow, with sufficient numbers of staff attorneys who are
knowledgeable about routine legal matters and supervisory
mechanisms that monitor activities of subordinate personnel to ensure
they meet expected standards of competent, timely delivery of
services.147 Under the traditional paradigm, lawyers become involved
only when the client regards a problem as serious enough to actively
seek counsel, in spite of price fears and uncertainty about how to find
a good lawyer. Prepaid legal insurance guarantees access to identified
attorneys, who agree to perform some work for no additional fee, and
who also agree to structured fee caps on noncovered tasks.
Preventive legal advice is routinely offered at no additional cost to the
insured. For example, even in the most limited "free" or "access"
plans, the member may be entitled to free telephone consultations,
some free office visits, document review and will preparation, with
additional services available at a stipulated discount from the panel
lawyer's usual fee."' Comprehensive legal plans cover representation
for a vast array of administrative, consumer, financial, family and
estate law matters, as well as for nonfelony criminal charges. 4 The
striking emphasis on preventive lawyering encourages members to
phone a participating lawyer early on, before a serious problem
crystallizes.1 50 As part of the unlimited phone consultation covered by
most plans, lawyers may follow up with calls or letters on a client's
behalf in an effort to resolve the problem. 5' While there is a risk of
overutilization and unreasonable contentiousness by some members,
these do not appear to be significant problems. As part of one's
advisory function, sometimes the plan lawyer must counsel clients that
not all problems in life are susceptible to legal resolution, and that
alternative, nonlegal solutions may be more appropriate. 2
146. See, e.g., Seron, supra note 139, at 66-68 (describing one in-house union plan
with specialist teams responsible for different practice areas; teams of lawyers and
social workers stressed problem resolution).
147. See id. at 64.
148. API Technical Assistance Series, supra note 123, at 5-6.
149. Id. at 4-5, 11-16 (sample plan description).
150. Telephone Interview with Stephanie L Theban, Manager of Pre-Paid Legal
Services Department, Riggs, Abney, Neal, Turpen, Orbison & Lewis, P.C. (June 20,
2001). The Riggs, Abney firm is the Oklahoma closed-panel provider for Pre-Paid
Legal Services, Inc., based in Ada, Oklahoma. There are currently about 40,000
Oklahoma members; the firm receives a monthly payment per insured member as
compensation for providing comprehensive legal services to plan members. A
referral system is used for clients located too distant from the firm's offices. In
matters presenting impermissible conflicts, the plan handles referral to an outside
attorney. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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Quality control and customer satisfaction are high priorities for plan
promoters. Financial success as a business enterprise requires that
customers be satisfied with the value received for the monthly
premiums so that they keep the policies in force and refer new
members.'53 The better programs carefully screen prospective
providers, requiring detailed applications, personal interviews, local
references and a minimum amount of experience in listed practice
areas. 54 Plan administration typically includes sophisticated reporting
systems that gather computerized information on client usage,
promptness in returning phone calls and performance of tasks.
Periodic status reports allow the law firm and plan administrator to
monitor performance and evaluate the need for changes to improve
quality control. For example, Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc., which
operates nationwide, receives daily computer reports on client-
initiated contacts, time lapse before calls returned and actions taken
on client requests. Formalized evaluation of providers takes place
monthly, with written performance evaluation and contract reviews
done semi-annually. 55  According to a plan administrator and a
provider supervisor employed with Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc., the
plan respects client confidences and lawyers' independent professional
judgment, with the sole focus of plan monitoring to gauge timely
performance and customer satisfaction. Despite some critics'
skepticism about the intrusiveness of "managed care," these
monitoring mechanisms appear to be benign and staunchly client-
centered. Unlike most middle income consumers, these plan
members know whom to call when they have a legal problem, and
how to handle a problem with their lawyer (through the 800 number
hotline, and written complaint procedures). Thus, the plan's
provisions give members greater recourse than is readily available to
most middle income consumers, whose complaints about their
lawyers' derelictions and incompetence generally fall on deaf ears
until multiple complaints of egregious conduct compel official
attention in the disciplinary arena.
C. Lessons from Health Care Service Plans
During his tenure as ABA President in 1965, Lewis Powell
committed the organization to improving availability of legal services
for ordinary citizens. He perceived that intransigence by the
American medical profession caused a move towards socialized
153. See Seron, supra note 139, at 82 (stating that keeping pre-paid legal services
customers satisfied is good business sense).
154. NRCCLS website, supra note 4.
155. API Technical Assistance Series, supra note 123, at 8-9 n.122; Telephone
Interview with Leslie Fisher, Vice-President of Attorney Resources, Pre-Paid Legal
Services, Inc. (May 22, 2001); see E. Allen Farnsworth, Contracts, § 8.4, 530-31 (3d ed.
1998) (discussing conditions of satisfaction).
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medicine, and wanted to avert similar pressures for access to legal
care.156 Skeptics of group legal services caution that similar problems
to managed health care could arise when insurance carriers and
business managers are involved with the delivery of legal services.1
7
Certainly, the managed care debates raise legitimate concerns about
intrusions on independent professional judgment that could
compromise quality of services. In-depth comparison of group health
and legal service delivery systems must await another day.
Nevertheless, some lessons can be drawn from the difficulties
experienced in the health care industry as the legal profession
experiments with new forms of delivering services to middle-class
consumers.
The perceived need for health care insurance is a much higher
priority than legal expense insurance." When medical needs go
unmet, physical conditions may deteriorate further, resulting in death
or disability. The adverse consequences of untended legal problems
typically are less visible, immediate and dramatic. Public demand for
solutions that increase access to health care and spread cost risks has
risen steadily since the late nineteenth century.' 59 Physicians, like
lawyers, have traditionally clung to individualized delivery of service,
aggressively resisting innovative group delivery systems. Thus,
traditional Blue Cross/Blue Shield health insurance was strongly
preferred by the American Medical Association ("AMA"), and other
powerful physician trade groups because it left participation open to
all physician providers, with patients free to select the physicians of
their choice.1"
Group medical care has been around in some form since the 1930s.
Odd combinations of piecemeal regulation, legislative politics and
judicial intervention have not served well the interests of patients or
their physician providers. Starting in 1971, the Nixon administration
actively promoted the concept of Health Maintenance Organizations
("HMOs"), which provide comprehensive services through their own
staff of salaried professionals."' Federal legislation encouraged
widespread development of HMOs that provided comprehensive
health care services to individuals who voluntarily enrolled and paid
in advance a fixed price that ensured access to comprehensive health
156. See Powell Interview, supra note 19, at 2; see also Werner Pfennigstorf &
Spencer L. Kimball, Legal Service Plans: Approaches to Regulation 444, 447-51
(1977) (describing organized medical profession's vehement opposition to group
delivery of health care).
157. Cf. Sandy Theiss, Hyatt Hopes Voters Will Take His Word on it, Dayton Daily
News, Apr. 6, 1994.
158. Pfenningstorf & Kimball, supra note 156. at 442.
159. Id at 444.
160. Id. at 448.
161. Id at 452-53.
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care services. 62  Effectively nullifying the organized medical
profession's opposition to such closed panel delivery systems, the
HMOs were then able to capture a significant market share of prepaid
health care. Increasingly, HMOs were able to shift to the physician
providers the economic risks associated with delivering all medical
care to enrolled members.163 This situation worsened after the
Supreme Court construed ERISA's insurance clause very narrowly,
effectively leaving the health care industry unregulated and immune
to common law actions for malpractice or bad faith denial of
coverage. 1' 4 Since that time, complaints about quality of care and
unreasonable refusal to refer patients to necessary specialists have
increased, although efforts are pending to enact a federal Patient's Bill
of Rights to remedy these problems. In addition, when HMO's fail
financially, or the physician provider groups that have accepted risk
under capitated fee systems cut back on appropriate services, the
patients are denied the medical care they paid for in advance.
To the extent that consumers have the financial resources and
practical freedom to change their health care coverage, many have
done so, returning to Blue Cross/Blue Shield or other private
insurance systems. Here, too, however, providers have complained
about managed care and unwarranted intrusions on their exercise of
independent professional judgment about appropriate care, specialist
referrals and medication. By contrast to what is happening in the
HMO industry, these complaints about administrative bureaucracy
and interference with professional judgment by nonmedical insurance
claims adjusters are less disquieting. Private insurance carriers have
moved away from complete "free choice" among physician providers,
by offering more favorable premium rates to members who enroll in
"preferred provider" systems. In-network preferred providers must
undergo initial qualification screenings and must agree to payment
under a predetermined formula and procedures, in which they agree
to accept a flat fee, or a percentage of an allowed charge for specific
services as full compensation, thus limiting what the providers can
demand as payment from the individual insured. If an insured enrolls
in the preferred provider plan, and thereafter uses a physician who is
"out of network," the plan pays a lower percentage of the allowed
charge, and the insured must pay any difference directly to the
provider.
It would appear that this system is working fairly well, providing
some quality assurance mechanisms, and limiting the amount of
uninsured medical expenses falling on individual consumers. It also
appears to be having an impact on the pricing activity of medical
providers who are "out of network." Although they are not
162. Id. at 453.
163. Id.
164. Bogan, ERISA, supra note 2, at 19-25.
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contractually limited to what they can charge the insured patient,
some out of network providers voluntarily agree to charge the patient
only the amount that the patient would have to pay an in-network
provider. That is, some providers are adjusting their pricing in order
to attract patients who would otherwise have a financial disincentive
to go out of network. The end result: furthering free choice in the
marketplace, with voluntary price controls by providers.
CONCLUSION
What are the lessons of prepaid health care for the future of
prepaid group legal services? We might take heed that, if the
pendulum swings too far in favor of closed panels, the plan promoters
might flex their economic power, exacting too much from lawyer
providers. At present, closed panels are preferred by the scholarly
and empirical literature, and seem to be working well at affording
access to quality legal services at reasonable prices. The dynamic
tension between professionalism, entrepreneurship and managerial
controls appears reasonably balanced. Right now, the developing
group legal services industry may be well served by closed plans. As
the industry develops, however, there may be danger that large closed
plans will use their market power to unreasonably shift the financial
risk of comprehensive legal service plans to providers, compromising
the lawyer-providers' independent professional judgment and the
resulting quality of services. Therefore, it behooves the legal
profession to track these developments and make appropriate
adjustments in the competitive legal marketplace so that clients do not
become captives of an unresponsive system. If closed plans begin to
act like monopolists, there may be a viable marketplace for open, or
modified closed private insurance plans based on the Blue Cross/Blue
Shield model. Accordingly, the bar should abandon its traditional
resistance to group legal services, and willingly embrace innovative
forms of practice that enhance middle-class access to affordable legal
services.
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